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We epidemiologists have long recognized the importance
of using rigorous causal inference approaches to design and
analyze our studies. Causal diagrams comprise one such
tool for formalizing assumed data-generating processes.
And indeed, the ubiquity and importance of causal dia-
grams within epidemiology is evidenced by four articles
presented in this issue of the European Journal of Epi-
demiology [1–4]. As epidemiologic studies are often used
to inform clinical and policy decision-making, we have
also understood the need to unambiguously communicate
our studies’ findings amongst ourselves and across the
disciplines with whom we collaborate. While others have
taught and espoused how causal diagrams can guide and
improve our study designs and analyses [5–7], perhaps one
of the most transformative aspects of the current ‘‘revolu-
tion’’—in the words of Porta et al. [4]—is that we have
adopted tools that enhance the clarity of our study con-
clusions and the premises on which they rest.
Causal diagrams as (formal) story-telling
When and why are causal diagrams useful? One of the
most evident successes of causal diagrams is in supple-
menting story-telling. With a few arrows and letters, an
investigator can tell a story of a data-generating process.
For a reader fluent in causal diagrams, even a dauntingly
complex story can now be quickly and fully digested. In
this way, we have seen a series of ‘‘paradoxes’’ demysti-
fied, including proposed explanations for the so-called
Berkson’s [8], birth-weight [9], obesity [10], and Simp-
son’s [11] paradoxes. Similarly, causal diagrams focused
our attention on the structures of oft overlooked potential
biases, such as biases due to time-dependent confounding
in stratification-based analyses [12], mediator-outcome
confounding in mediation analyses [13], selecting on
treatment in instrumental variable analyses [14], and naı¨ve
per-protocol restrictions in randomized trial analyses [15].
Readers familiar with causal diagrams will recognize that
many of these examples can be described as collider-
stratification biases, and that, while some encompass pre-
viously recognized threats to validity, these potential biases
were infrequently mentioned until their associated causal
diagrams were drawn.
Beyond demystifying perplexing patterns or illuminat-
ing subtle problems that exist across many studies, causal
diagrams can also facilitate debates regarding a specific
study’s conclusions. Consider two investigators who are in
disagreement over whether a specific study’s analysis and
conclusions were appropriate. If these two investigators
‘‘speak DAG’’ (directed acyclic graph) then they may
seamlessly convey their assumptions and ideas to one
another with little fear of miscommunication. Perhaps the
two investigators will realize they had different causal
diagrams in mind, and that favoring one analytic approach
over another depends on which causal diagram is drawn—
and thus on particular assumptions that, undrawn, might
have suggested favoring a different analysis. Perhaps they
will even be able to collect further data to help settle on
which causal diagram—which set of assumptions—is more
reasonable. Such discussions, which can be cumbersome
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and confusing without a formal language, can take place
quickly and explicitly when supplemented with causal
diagrams.
In these ways, a causal diagram, like a picture, is worth
one thousand words. Unlike artwork, however, where the
‘‘thousand words’’ convey a subjective perspective, a
causal diagram should convey exactly the thousand words
its creator and all other fluent readers would attribute to it.
Causal diagrams are useful because they facilitate precise
communication, but ignoring the formal rules that govern
them can lead to miscommunication. For some examples of
this, we can turn to an article in this issue of the European
Journal of Epidemiology in which Greenland and Man-
sournia [3] caution how failing to read a causal DAG as
encoding only structural (not random) confounding or
failing to be explicit about faithfulness when presumed can
lead readers of a causal diagram to perceive a different
‘‘thousand words’’ than intended.
As with any tool that can streamline communication,
there is also a danger of causal diagrams providing a false
sense of security when they are constructed without
investigators applying deep thought and subject matter
knowledge. To see this, consider the use of causal diagrams
in the context of instrumental variable analyses. Many
epidemiology studies with instrumental variable analyses
redraw the same textbook instrumental variable causal
diagram to justify their analysis, yet the story is rarely as
straightforward as the one depicted in that causal diagram.
Herna´n and Robins [16], Swanson et al. [14] and Van-
derWeele et al. [17] have presented expanded versions of
this standard graph that illustrate relatively subtle yet
potentially common ways in which bias could arise. Thus,
redrawing the textbook version of a causal diagram may
oversimplify the likely data-generating process and even
offer false comfort when applied to a specific study. Of
note, some have argued that causal diagrams are not useful
in the context of instrumental variable analyses because
‘‘the’’ DAG seems so simple that drawing it does not add to
our understanding of the process [18]. While causal dia-
grams (arguably) add less to our understanding of what is a
true instrument, we have seen many examples of causal
diagrams adding substantially to our understanding of what
is not an instrument.
If two epidemiologists ‘‘speak DAG’’ fluently and think
deeply while constructing causal diagrams, they can
cleanly convey their premises and ideas to one another with
little fear of miscommunication. However, many of us are
not fluent in causal diagrams. Moreover, fluency or even
familiarity with causal diagrams is currently rare among
the broad range of medical researchers, clinicians, and
policy-makers with whom we work. While our field would
doubtlessly benefit from having more fluent speakers, we
as a field ought to ask ourselves: should fluency in causal
diagrams be a requisite in our training and communication
standards?
The case for causal inference ‘‘multilingualism’’
Causal diagrams are attractive because they facilitate clear
communication. Of course, the same argument can be
made for other formal representations, including the
counterfactual outcome framework that DAGs are linked
with in this issue [2]. Should epidemiologists favor one
framework over another? Ultimately, translations between
these representations are achievable, as evident by the
mathematical equivalencies between the DAG-based do-
calculus and the counterfactual-based g-formula [2, 19–
21]. Nonetheless, in our day-to-day work as epidemiolo-
gists, an argument could be made that learning to both
‘‘speak DAG’’ and ‘‘speak counterfactuals’’ will deepen
our own comprehension of our subject matter.
Being well-versed in multiple formal representations of
causality can lead to not just clearer but also more efficient
communication. For example, some assumptions (e.g.,
directionality or monotonicity of treatment effects) are
readily stated via counterfactuals but require augmenta-
tions to our causal diagrams. Indeed, defining causality
without mention of counterfactual outcomes—as counter-
factuals are not immediately apparent in DAGs, although
they do take center-stage in single-world intervention
graphs [22]—may seem at times like learning a language
with one less tense. On the other hand, particularly in high-
dimensional data, translating a data-generating process
from a causal diagram to a list of independencies expressed
with counterfactuals can be onerous—why do we need to
use so many phrases to express something that would
otherwise be succinctly (and appropriately) stated in a
diagram? Each representation has advantages, and being
facile with multiple formal representations allows us to
capitalize on the benefits of all.
Considering the benefits of causal inference ‘‘multilin-
gualism’’ lends itself to another question we should ponder:
should every epidemiologist learn every language? As a
corollary question, what would be the benefits of a causal
inference Esperanto that explicitly combines the best of
graphical and counterfactual language? Perhaps the future
of succinct and clear communication in epidemiology lies
in single-world intervention graphs [22].
Conclusion
Regardless of the framework in which it is couched,
inferring causality comes down to combining data and
assumptions. As epidemiologists, we make causal
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inferences all the time. Consequently, it is our responsi-
bility to communicate effectively the assumptions we are
making and the way in which we combine assumptions
with data. Science benefits when communication is flaw-
less—i.e., when our premises are precisely and transpar-
ently stated, and our results are accurately interpreted. In
embracing causal diagrams, we are indicating our com-
mitment to unambiguous communication.
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